Maskin, Eric 1950 -
The Arrow Impossibility Theorem - New York Columbia University Press 2014 - 152 (pp) 22 x 15 cm - Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture Series .
Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking "impossibility theorem" was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen explore the implications of Arrow's theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorem's value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, and Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal-given the impossibility of achieving the ideal. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow himself, as well as essays by Maskin, Dasgupta, and Sen outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.
9780231153287
Economia
Economia del benestar--Estat del benestar
Sociologia--Canvi social
Models matemàtics
ECONOMÍA
ESTADO DEL BIENESTAR
TEORÍA ECONÓMICA
DEMOCRACIA
HISTORIA ECONÓMICA
MODELOS MATEMÁTICOS
CAMBIO SOCIAL
Teorema de la imposibilidad de Arrow
304.9:330.8
The Arrow Impossibility Theorem - New York Columbia University Press 2014 - 152 (pp) 22 x 15 cm - Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture Series .
Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking "impossibility theorem" was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen explore the implications of Arrow's theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorem's value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, and Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal-given the impossibility of achieving the ideal. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow himself, as well as essays by Maskin, Dasgupta, and Sen outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.
9780231153287
Economia
Economia del benestar--Estat del benestar
Sociologia--Canvi social
Models matemàtics
ECONOMÍA
ESTADO DEL BIENESTAR
TEORÍA ECONÓMICA
DEMOCRACIA
HISTORIA ECONÓMICA
MODELOS MATEMÁTICOS
CAMBIO SOCIAL
Teorema de la imposibilidad de Arrow
304.9:330.8